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Abstract: Egypt started a recent judicial reform program in 2007, which can be considered 
the first ever since the establishment of the National Egyptian Judicial System in 1952. It 
focuses mainly on solving organizational problems within First Instance Courts (FIC), as 
they form the active cell of the Egyptian judicial system. However the efficiency of FICs is still 
doubtable to a large extent. This paper provides for the first time an efficiency analysis of 22 
FICs in Egypt using the technique of Data Envelop Analysis (DEA). The main strength of this 
study is to consider the number of computers per court, as none of the previous papers on 
court efficiency has included a capital variable when defining their court production function 
before.  Our  results show that there are no significant differences observed in terms of 
management efficiency between the civil and criminal FICs, however criminal FICs districts 
are superior with respect to their corresponding civil districts in terms of program efficiency. 
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First Instance Courts (FICs) are considered the active cell of the Egyptian judicial system. 
Accordingly, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has announced that the key to developing and 
achieving progress in the judicial system in Egypt requires building up efficient institutions 
for these courts and improving the quality of their judges, without losing sight regarding the 
rest of the judicial system. The idea behind focusing on FIC as a first attempt of the 2007 
judicial reform program stems from the fact that these courts are the first to receive public 
prosecutors that are to become judges and court presidents of higher degrees after a while. 
Accordingly if they are best perceived and built up from the very beginning at this stage of 
their judicial career, they will be promoted as qualified efficient judicial councillors to the 
courts of Appeal and the court of Cassation after completing their required phase in the FIC. 
In other words, they started building up stable roots or ground to maintain a solid structure for 
the whole system on a long term basis. However, the absence of previously adopted 
accountable performance measures and studies within the Egyptian judicial system hinders 
the identification of important reform factors and leads to the inability to draw any 
conclusions about the significance of the current reform procedure. This fact becomes even 
more evident when referring to a quantitative assessment, due to the paucity of quantitative 
data describing judicial or court performance in developing countries in general. 
As a first attempt to analyse the efficiency of individual FICs in Egypt, this study mainly 
depends on primary sourced data and statistics which were self-collected and have not been 
published or provided in this form before. We use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), instead 
of simple performance indicators (e.g. resolution rate) to measure court efficiency. The study 
is implemented over the civil criminal districts of 22 FICs. The objective is to answer the 
following questions: Are there significant efficiency differences between the civil and 
criminal courts when compared with the best observed practices in their own jurisdiction –
management efficiency–? Can one jurisdiction be considered superior when compared to the 
other in terms of program efficiency?  
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Councilor Ahmed Zaki (MOJ) for his excellent cooperation and provision of 
necessary data for this study, Professor Bernd Hayo for his support and constructive comments and last but not 
least Professor Stefan Voigt for his guidance, continuous advice and motivation.    3 
Since the early 1990’s analyzing the link between different aspects and characteristics of 
judicial reform and economic growth has become an important research area. North (1990:54) 
argues that the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is 
the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment 
in the third world. A well performing judiciary is considered a prerequisite for economic 
development, through enforcing property rights, controlling the abuse of government power, 
protecting the rule of law and last but not least securing the exchange of goods and services 
between private parties (Messick, 2002)
2
Accordingly, there were huge efforts done and a significant amount of grants given by 
international donor organizations, for example the World  Bank (WB), the International 
Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank to improve judicial performance in 
developing countries. These organizations have devoted a budget of over $800 million in 
loans for judicial reform in developing countries (Messick, 2002). Moreover, the WB and the 
UNDP have provided great assistantship to some Arab countries like Morocco, Egypt, West 
Bank and Gazza and Yemen  to improve the institutional quality of their judicial system 
(Messick, 2002). However, little effort has been done till now to analyze judicial performance 
or measure the efficiency of the judicial system within the Arab region, especially in Egypt
. Weder (1995) explains that a weak legal system is 
considered one of the main obstacles to economic development in general. Some scholars 
have  focused on individual institutional characteristics of the judiciary or certain judicial 
procedures in order to empirically test their impact on economic growth. Feld and Voigt 
(2003) on the one hand, called for achieving greater levels of judicial independence as they 
proved that it is a main determinant of economic growth. On the other hand, Hayo and Voigt 
(2008) showed that a number of judicial procedures positively affect economic growth, as 
they tend to increase the predictability of court decisions, which leads to more transactions 
and higher investment levels.  
3
Egypt, is considered one of the most durable authoritarian countries of the world, nevertheless 
it enjoys one of the oldest and most developed and influential judicial structures in the Arab 
region (Moustafa, 2008). The first modern judicial system in Egypt started in 1830. Until 
1952, the Egyptian judicial system included in addition to Egyptian judges, also a number of 
French and English judges to ensure the fair treatment of foreign citizens in Egypt (Mixed 
Court System). In 1952, after the Egyptian revolution, the first Egyptian national judicial 
.  
                                                 
2 See also Messick (1999, 2004) and Posner (1998). 
3 There are a few studies e.g. Scott (1899) and Cannon (1972), who tried to assess the performance of the 
Egyptian judicial system before the 1952 revolution referring to the problems of mixed court systems.   4 
system was formed and foreign judges were eliminated. Nasser’s nationalization policy led to 
massive capital flight from the country at the time, the new government was attempting to 
utilize national resources to build up the economy. Citizens felt the danger of loosing their 
property in the absence of credible judicial system that can protect their property rights. The 
rate of capital flight reached $2 billion per year which was approximately equivalent to three 
and a half times the rate of all domestic sources of investment of Egypt at that time. After 
Nasser’s death in 1970,  his successor Anwar Sadat who was faced with economic stagnation 
and escalating pressure from international lenders tried to restore the Egyptian economy 
through trying to attract Egyptian nationals to bring back their savings to Egypt, in addition to 
attracting foreign direct investment. Accordingly, he tried to win back their trust and ensure 
the provision of property right protection. Finally in 1979 and after a full decade of failed 
attempts to attract investment without implementing concrete institutional safeguards on 
property rights, the regime managed to establish the  Supreme Constitutional Court. This 
Court is considered the first constitutional court in Egypt and in the Arab region and has the 
power of judicial review. The new court was designed mainly in order to win back the trust of 
investors and guarantee institutional constraints on executive actions (Moustafa, 2007). Hence 
it can be said that Egypt managed to discover the relation between economic development and 
judicial system ever since the establishment of its Supreme Constitutional Court.  
The rest of the article is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional structure of 
the Egyptian ordinary court system, as well as the embedded efficiency obstacles of FICs. 
Section 3 explains the methodology of the study. Section 4 describes the data, the model 
specification and the results. Last but not least section 5 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. The Egyptian Court System  
2.1 Hierarchical Structure of Ordinary Courts 
According to Egypt’s 1971 constitution, the  Egyptian judicial system  is an independent 
branch of the government. Since the establishment of the State Council (Maglis-Al-Dawla) 
according to law 112 of 1988, Egypt has adopted a dual judicial system: the administrative 
and the ordinary judiciary. The administrative judiciary has the jurisdiction to decide on 
administrative disputes in which any governmental entity is involved, while the ordinary 
courts are responsible for settling the regular criminal and civil cases among any two parties. 
Courts are organized  according to the law of judicial power of 1972 and its several 
amendments  in a hierarchical order according to their respective power  (figure 1).  The   5 
Supreme Court is on top of this rank, followed by the Courts of Appeal, the FICs or Courts of 
First Instance and finally the Partial Courts.  
















There exists only one Supreme Court which is based in Cairo and has exclusive superior 
power over all other lower degree courts. However the Courts of Appeal are distributed within 
the capital of the different Egyptian governorates. Hence there exist eight Courts of Appeal 
which are located in Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta, Mansura, Ismailia, Beni Suef, Asyut and Qena. 
FICs are usually established in the capital of each Egyptian governorate. There used to be 22 
main FICs, but due to the large expansion of the population in new emerging governorates, 
the number of FICs is going to be extended to 27 till 2011
4
                                                 
4The five additional courts ( North Sinai, South Sinai, Helwan,6
th of October and Red Sea) were parts of 
respective other larger courts ( Ismailia, Suez, South Cairo, Giza, Qena). The main focus will be on the 22 First 
Instance Courts as most reports provided by the ministry of justice still include aggregated figures of the court to 
be able to compare the court output with previous years.   
. In the domain of each FIC, small 
Partial Courts are formed to take care of less complicated cases that can be easily solved by 
one single judge. In total there exist about 337 Partial Courts. Decisions of a lower level court 
might be appealed against, at one of the higher level courts. In order to file a case in FIC, the 
minimum value of the case should exceed 6,800$ after the reform program (since 2007), as 
before that time the critical value was 1,700 $, otherwise the case should be filed in a Partial 
Court (Mokhtar, 2010).    In addition a number of specialized courts like Family Courts 
(handling personal affairs cases) that were established according to law 10 of 2004 and 
recently Economic Courts (handling commercial and economic cases), established under law 
120 of 2008 started to emerge in order to create judicial specialization within the system. 
Partial Courts 
First Instance Courts (FICs) 
Courts of Appeal 
Supreme Court  
of Justice   6 
 
2.2 Obstacles of Judicial Efficiency 
The deterrents of optimal judicial performance in Egypt can mainly be due financial and 
organizational factors (Elshahed, 2009).  
•  Financial obstacles: Despite the fact that a number of studies  like Posner (2005), 
Buscaglia and Ulen (1997)  have proved that increasing financial resources will not 
improve judicial performance; Egyptian judicial experts still link the weak performance of 
the judges to their levels of income. Judicial staff members still complain about their low 
income levels and put it as a main source of inefficiency of the system. 
It can be said that the main problem of the judicial wage system in Egypt is that it is still 
functioning under law 46 of 1972 and its several extensions: law17 of 1976, law 54 of 
1978, law 143 of 1980, law 11, 114 and 138 of 1981, law 32 of 1983 and finally law 35 
and 53 of 1984. This law implies giving judicial staff member a minimal fixed base salary 
while having an additional  larger variable salary.  This fixed base salary assigned for 
judicial staff members did  not  change since 1972; however law 32 of 1983 implied 




, to offset inflation.  The  sum of annual basic salaries of  the Egyptian High 
Constitutional Court judges  for example were  estimated to be $370,440 for the year 
2007/2008, while the sum of the variable salaries  in form of incentives and bonuses 
reached an amount of $4,260,060 (Elgebaly, 2009:36). Table 1 below gives a picture of 
wages assigned to the different judicial career categories according to law 1972, compared 
to the net real wages including bonuses and other variable salary categories which are not 
registered in any formal decree. Hence the only way to observe them was through carrying 
different interviews with local prominent experts of the Ministry of Justice and different 







                                                 
5 Given that the per capita income of Egypt is equivalent to 5.460 US dollars (World Development Indicators 
database, World Bank, 7 October 2009) 
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Table 1. Formal and Informal Wages of different Judicial Career Levels according to Law 46 
of 1972 in US $. 
 
 
Source: Law of Judicial Power number 46, 1972, p. 71-72; interviews at the Egyptian MOJ and the Economic 
Court of North Cairo. 
 
 
From the previous table it can be seen that despite the fact that judicial salary has been 
raised to a large extent due to the addition of a larger amount of variable salary (bonuses 
extra working hours, travel expenses and some other subsidies) most judges still can not 
consider it as being fair to reward a judge and motivate his incentives. Table 2 below 
shows a comparison between the judicial salaries of a regular judge (starting salary) in 10 
Mediterranean countries
6
                                                 
6 Only this group of countries could have been chosen, due to the paucity of published data regarding the judicial 
salaries in other Arab or African countries. 
  including  Egypt.  In order to be able to observe a better 
comparison regarding a fair level of judicial salary among countries, the net salary is 
divided by the corresponding GDP per capita of each country.  
Judicial Career Category 
Annual Basic 
Wage  
(according to Law 
46, 1972) 
Annual Actual Wage 
(US$) 
Head of the Supreme Court  2,876  22,226 
Head of Court of Appeal  2,320-2,868   17,582.4 
Head of First Instance Court degree (Judge A)  1,548-2,364   11,113 
Head of First Instance Court degree (Judge B)  1,308-2,064   8,890-11,113 
Regular Judge  1,080-1,868  8,791.2 
Attorney  780-1,464  6,593.4   8 
 























a Law of Judicial Power number 46, 1972, p. 71-72; interviews at the Egyptian ministry of Justice and the 
Economic Court of North Cairo, as for the rest of the countries, data were obtained from the  European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice CEPEG 2008 evaluation report.  
b CIA (2009): https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2004rank.html?countryNa-
me=Tokelau&countryCode=tl&regionCode=au&rank=214#tl). 
 
It seems that Egypt ranks 4
th  among the chosen 10 Mediterranean countries. Hence 
although judicial salary in Egypt might look low in absolute terms, it turns out to be in 
line with, if not better than other Mediterranean countries when taking the GDP per capita 
of the country into consideration.  However it must be mentioned that income was 
calculated through taking the respective GDP per capita of each country into 
consideration. In other words, we considered income in real terms instead of using the 
nominal values. Using the nominal values Egypt occupies the least rank.  
 
•  Organizational Obstacles: the organizational obstacles surrounding the Egyptian  
     Judicial system can be simply summarized by referring to the following factors: 
i.  The judges’ qualification and employment system. As mentioned before there is 
no specific agreed upon performance criteria for appointing judges in Egypt. A 
grade of at least good is currently required to apply for a judicial career job, 
however real life examples show that students with lower grades were preferred 
over students with higher grades without providing any interpretation for their 
evaluation  criteria. Hence it can be said that the appointment criteria is still 
County 
Net (starting) 







capita income level 
Bosnia  21,671  6,400  3.39 
Turkey  24,983   11,400  2.19 
Monaco  56,368   30,000  1.88 
Egypt
a  8,791  6,000  1.47 
Spain  49,127  33,600  1.46 
Montenegro  14,085  9,800  1.44 
France  44,348  32,600  1.36 
Greece  40,550  31,000  1.31 
Italy  36,261   29,900  1.21 
Croatia  20,250  17,500  1.16   9 
vague and does not necessarily reflect a certain performance.  Law school 
graduates are appointed as attorneys without any formal training. They used to 
spend a training duration for 4 months before they are nominated to serve as 
judges. Aleslambuly (2009: 58) refers to the fact that a minimum of one year 
training should be put as a requirement for an attorney to be appointed as a 
judge. Moreover he states that for a law school student to enter the judicial 
career, he must first go through a probation phase of one year, during which he 
attends intensive preparatory courses. Afterwards each student shall receive an 
evaluation and only those who perform well may be appointed as judges, the rest 
can be assigned some other judiciary related administrative jobs. There has been 
already a law drafted to support this idea in 2008. It concerned establishing a so 
called “Judicial Academy” where judicial candidates can attend a probation 
phase before  being assigned a formal judicial position. It involves judicial 
training and additional qualifying courses to ensure high judicial quality among 
those who are going to occupy judicial positions. This law however is not being 
approved by the parliament yet.  There exists an essential need for such 
qualifying courses as the judicial system of FICs lacks high qualified judiciary. 
The only qualification they have is their bachelor certificate from law school. 
Table 3 shows that during 2009, only 16.7% of total judicial staff of FICs in 
Egypt enjoys a higher qualifying degree, like PhD, Masters or even a certified 
diploma with a minimal number of PhD holders (1%).     10 





































 Source: MOJ (2009). 
 
ii.  Judicial inspection procedures that  are carried out  in  FICs.  The judicial 
inspection department is the authority responsible for evaluating the performance 
of  FICs. They gather reports on the rate of case resolution, filed cases and 
pending cases from each court.  Hence their main job is to collect data and 
present statistics about the performance of each court and each judge within the 
court. Before the implementation of the new 2007 judicial reform program, the 
judicial inspection department used to issue evaluation reports mainly based on 
information  submitted by individual courts including the number of 
accomplished cases per judge. This evaluation method led to observing a kind of 
misleading performance measure as data and information were to a large extend 
biased and  manipulated  by individual courts. Accordingly,  judges  tended  to 
Court  PhD   Master  Diploma  Total 
North Cairo  2.0  6.9  16.2  25.1 
South Cairo  1.8  10.0  15.4  27.1 
Giza  0.8  4.6  10.8  16.3 
Banha  1.6  11.1  17.5  30.2 
Alexandria  0.0  4.0  6.7  10.7 
Tanta  0.5  3.3  7.6  11.4 
Shebin El Kom  1.4  5.1  8.7  15.2 
Mansurah  1.4  6.2  10.5  18.1 
Zakazik  0.5  4.3  9.2  14.0 
Damanhour  0.5  3.2  7.4  11.1 
Kafr El Sheikh  1.3  6.9  4.4  12.5 
Damietta  0.0  11.8  5.9  17.6 
Ismailia  0.0  5.7  7.5  13.2 
Port-Said  2.3  9.3  11.6  23.3 
Suez  2.2  19.6  17.4  39.1 
Fayum  0.0  11.7  7.4  19.1 
Beni Suef  2.1  9.5  13.7  25.3 
Menia  0.8  5.3  8.3  14.4 
Asyut  0.0  7.9  9.2  17.1 
Sohag  1.4  2.2  4.3  8.0 
Qena  0.6  2.4  4.3  7.3 
Aswan  1.6  3.2  7.9  12.7 
All FICs  1.0  6.1  9.6  16.7   11 
handle easy and simple cases rather than long complicated ones to achieve a high 
record on the one hand. On the other hand, judges stopped spending too much 
time on each individual case to carefully analyze its components and evidence 
which might lead to misjudging the case or neglecting an important part of the 
evidence. The first fact can be used to explain the reason behind the increasing 
number of pending cases, while the second fact may be considered a main 
determinant of the huge number of appealed cases in Egyptian FICs.  
iii.  Promotion procedure and the selection of the highest ranking judicial positions 
in  ordinary judiciary.  This procedure is usually done in a systematic way 
according to the nature of the judicial career system and the final decision is then 
to be taken by the judicial council and approved by the president of Egypt. To 
take the final decision, official performance reports about the number of finished 
cases are used
7
iv.  Outsourcing judges.  This is a widespread phenomenon among the judicial 
system in Egypt, due to its judicial leadership position among different Arab and 
African countries in the region. Most Judges prefer to participate in this program 
to obtain a greater salary, as outsourced judges are paid according to the salary 
scheme of the host country, which indeed has a higher per capita income level. 
As it is difficult to obtain clear estimates of judicial salaries in other Arab and 
African host countries, one can look at the different per capita income levels of 
the different Arab host countries to observe an estimate of how much more a 
judge would be paid compared to his original salary in Egypt (see table 4 below). 
Moreover outsourced judges are offered free housing as well as transportation 
facilities, in addition to free flight tickets for him and for his family. Hence they 
are able to save a huge amount of their salary. Outsourcing judges negatively 
affects the Egyptian judicial system as it links judges away from their original 
goals in their own country. Moreover the type of cases judges handle during their 
, without referring to the degree of difficulty of the case, nor the 
quality of decisions taken by each judge. Accordingly the system embeds a weak 
relation between performance and promotion, as it is rather built on a strong 
relation between age; connections and promotion. Such a system creates weak 
incentives to observe special skills  along the career  and inhibits competitive 
performance among judges.  
                                                 
7 The judicial inspection department for example carries such reports for the FICs. Court performance data are 
collected on a monthly basis, including the workload per judge.    12 
stay outside the country may differ to some degree from the nature of cases in 
Egypt which would not add to their experience in solving cases when they return 
to Egypt (Aleslambuly, 2009: 61). 
                     Table 4. GDP per capita in some Arab Countries in 2009 
 
Country  GDP per capita  
(PPP) (in US$) 
Qatar  119,500 
Kuwait  52,800 
UAE  38,900 
Bahrain  38,800 
Oman  25,000 
Saudi Arabia  20,600 
Egypt  6,000 
 




v.  Number of judges. Most judicial staff members agree that Egyptian Courts are 
understaffed, which is the main reason behind court inefficiencies. The number 
of judges must steadily increase to match the steady increase in population and 
number of filed cases (Aleslambuly, 2009; Elshahed, 2009). However, recent 
statistical analysis by the MOJ found out that the existing number of judicial 
staff members is sufficient to handle the existing cases available in the Egyptian 
FICs (Egyptian Ministry of Justice, 2009).  
vi.  The absence of judicial specialization.  Till October 2008 and before the 
establishment of separate economic courts, commercial as well as economic 
cases were handled by ordinary unspecialized courts. Judges were spending 
some time tackling commercial cases, then a second period tackling criminal or 
civil cases and so on. Hence the structure of the system was not providing a 
persistent field of specialization for judges to improve their performance through 
experience and knowledge accumulation. 
vii.  Unfair Distribution of Caseload.  One of the main backlogs  of the Egyptian 
judicial system was the unfair distribution of case load among judges and/or 
among the different districts of one court. Judges who finish their work promptly 
were given higher workload to improve the overall performance of the court. 
                                                 
8https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html? 
countryName=Tokelau&countryCode=tl&regionCode=au&rank=214#tl). 
   13 
Even the degree of case difficulty varied a lot from some judges to others: good, 
efficient judges were given the most difficult cases. Hence judges who were 
performing well became reluctant to finish their cases in order to avoid 
additional workload and more complex cases. As for those who were lazy and 
slow, they didn’t find any motive to change their attitude as they are always 
backed up by others. Accordingly, when asking judges about the timeliness of 
their cases, they might blame the degree of difficulty or the number of their 
assigned cases. In order to avoid this conflict and to achieve a fair distribution of 
case load, the ministry of justice has used the so called Case Difficulty 
Coefficient (CDC) to ensure a fair distribution of case load among judges. This 
new statistical technique is developed in 1.10.2007 and is considered a main 
factor of the judicial reform program in FICs. It is calculated by assigning to 
each type of case (criminal, civil,…) a certain weight according to its degree of 
difficulty (average time spent to settle the case). Afterwards they divide (the 
number of available cases weighted by their  corresponding CDC)  by  (the 
available number of judges) to be able to decide upon the required judicial force 
to settle the cases. The MOJ then determines a predefined so called warm zone 
with a maximum, minimum and an average case load per judge and expects all 
FIC Districts to operate within this zone. It can be said that the CDC is a tool 
used to draw conclusions on the assigned case load per judge or per district court 
within the same FIC in a fair manner.  It is also used to project future needs of 
workforce, which led to the fact that there has not been a great change in the 
number of judicial staff members for the year 2008/2009. Implementing this case 
load distribution criterion in all Egyptian FICs shall encourage judges to finish 
their cases in the assigned time or even before without fearing additional 
unappreciated workload of others. As a result, it is expected that the number of 
assigned cases per judge decrease, while the number of resolved cases increase. 
The impact of using CDC on court efficiency is however unknown, due to the 
paucity of court level data before 2010.   14 
 
3. Methodology   
3.1 Court Efficiency versus Court Performance 
To analyze court performance previous scholars used to depend on court output related data. 
For example Schneider (2005) used an output index which comprises two variables, namely 
court  output  in terms of dispute resolution (finished cases either by trial, settlement, or 
withdrawal) and the number of published decisions.  Dalton  and Singer (2009) used the 
number of adjudications controlled by workload (filed plus pending cases) and in another 
attempt they used case duration or length (the total time from case filing to final disposition) 
as an indicator for court performance. Lopez (2008) however defined court’s output as being 
only composed of sentences and warrants, without controlling for the number of filed and 
pending cases. Comparing the clearance rate of FICs in Egypt, one should first differentiate 
between the clearance rate of civil and criminal cases within the judicial system.  In the circuit 
of each FIC there are a number of civil and criminal District Courts. Each type of court 
registers its case data independent from the other type. At the end the data of each type of 
District Courts is collected and summed up to represent the performance of each FIC. To 
measure court performance the MOJ usually depend on calculating the resolution rate of each 






This measure however might be misleading, as it does not account for the available resources 
or factor inputs used in the case resolution process of each court. This is why we should 
differentiate  between  court performance or output  and  court  efficiency,  as  the latter one 
requires considering the court inputs used (judges, other staff members, available 
computers,...) in the production of the court’s output (cases resolved).  Technical Efficiency 
(TE) is widely used instead of the more general concept of economic efficiency because the 
latter one is quite difficult to determine, as it requires additional information on the quality of 
case resolution. TE can be measured by examining whether a production unit (in our case: 
court) produces the maximum output given the level of inputs employed. Green (1993) 
defines the level of technical efficiency by the relationship between observed actual 
production and some ideal or potential production. We can think in this case of a production 
possibility frontier (PPF) with perfectly efficient courts lying on this frontier (technically 
efficient) and others lying inside this frontier (technically inefficient) with the ratio of actual   15 
to potential production defining the level of efficiency of the individual court. There exist 
different approaches to estimate the technical efficiency of a court. Seiford and Thrall (1990) 
generally categorize them into two main groups: parametric (stochastic) versus non-
parametric (non-stochastic) methods. 
Most studies conducted to measure judicial efficiency implement a non-parametric technique, 
e.g. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) using the size of the judiciary as a main if not the sole 
input factor for court output to measure court efficiency. The DEA technique provides an 
efficiency rank for each court within the whole judicial system; however it does not impose 
any assumptions on the functional form and the distribution assumption of the data which 
might be considered a disadvantage. However this technique is very useful when considering 
more than one output per production unit, as all other parametric or stochastic techniques only 
allow for one output per model. 
 
3.2. Assessing technical efficiency with data envelopment analysis 
DEA techniques were introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) using mathematical programming 
to pursue Farrell’s approach to technical efficiency measurement (Farrell, 1957). DEA is a 
non-parametric approach to measure efficiency. It evaluates the performance of peer units 
allowing the construction of a surface over the data, the so-called technological frontier, 
which permits the observed behaviour of a decision-making unit (DMU) to be compared with 
best observed practices.  DEA has been used in a large number of industries, including 
banking, airlines, railroads, schools, hospitals, farms and courts (Emrouznejad et al. 2008). 
Further details on DEA can be found in Cooper et al. (2007). 
Let us start by considering that we observe a sample of n DMUs, each DMUj (j=1,…,n) uses a 
set of m inputs xij (i=1,…,n) in order to obtain a set of s outputs yrj (r=1,…,s). The technology 
used to transform inputs into output is assumed to fulfill the standard properties suggested by 
Shephard (1970). Assuming variable returns to scale –a less restrictive approach–, the output-
oriented technical efficiency of DMU0 can be assessed with the BCC model (Banker et al. 
1984). As a result, the efficiency scores obtained are net of any scale effect. The BCC model 
measures the maximum feasible proportional increase in all outputs that the DMU0 could 
achieve without increasing its use of inputs. Thus, it assesses Farrell-Debreu-type technical 
efficiency, which is also called weak efficiency. 
However, once Farrell-Debreu efficiency has been reached, additional increases might still be 
possible in some outputs, as well as further reductions in some inputs, bringing DMU0 into a   16 
Pareto-Koopmans or stringly efficient status (Koopmans, 1951). In line with Ali and Seiford 
(1993), the output-oriented envelopment model of variable returns to scale makes it possible 
to obtain the efficiency of DMU0 φ0 and identify any slacks in both inputs and outputs by 
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xi0 and yr0 representing, respectively, the observed values of productive resource i and output r 
on DMU0. In addition, λj is a variable representing the weight of DMUj in the composition of 
the reference representing best observed practices; 
-
i0 s  and 
+
r0 s  being the slacks in input i and 
output r of DMU0, respectively.  
In Figure 2, DMUs A, B and C form an efficient frontier and hence DMUs D and E are 
considered inefficient, as they lie inside the frontier. The efficiency target of DMU D will be 
D1, that is, its radial projection onto the efficient frontier. In addition, the radial efficiency 
target of DMU E will be E1 and the distance CE1 represents the slack. 
The solution to program (1) for DMU0 provides a measure of its efficiency. It is restricted to 
being equal to or greater than one, and measures the maximum feasible proportional increase 
of all outputs that could be achieved by DMU0 without increasing its use of inputs. A score 
equal to one indicates best performance. The more the score deviates from one, the more 
inefficient the DMU is. For instance, a score of 1.1 would, for a given DMU0, mean that its 
outputs could be proportionally increased by 10% without consuming additional inputs.   17 
 





3.3. Estimating inter-programme efficiency 
The methodological approach to evaluating programme efficiency was developed in one of 
the first empirical papers on DEA by Charnes et al. (1981). This paper suggests that groups of 
DMUs belonging to different programmes might have different technological frontiers due to 
programme differences. The technical efficiency of DMUs operating under different 
programmes is assessed by distinguishing between  intra-program efficiency  and  inter-
program efficiency. While the former assesses the performance of DMUs when they are 
compared to the frontier of their own group or programme (within group efficiency), inter-
programme efficiency identifies differences in performance between the different programme 
types (among groups). Testing for the significance of differences in intra-program efficiency 
between the different programs allows us to identify whether efficiency differences between 
both types of programs (according to  case type) is due to managerial and institutional 
characteristics  of  each program or whether prevailing  inefficiencies  can  be attributed to 
random factors beyond the control of managers. This however does not allow us to draw any 
conclusion regarding the impact of belonging to a different program on court efficiency and 
that is why inter-program efficiency becomes necessary. 
Computing inter-programme efficiency requires four steps to be followed. In the first step, the 
sample is divided into two subsamples or groups, one for each of the different programmes(i 
our case: civil vs. criminal district courts) considered. Then, mathematical program (1) needs 
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us to assess the performance of each DMU when it is compared to the best practices within its 
own programme. In the second step, the inefficient DMUs in each group must be projected 
onto the technological frontier of their own group. The objective is to eliminate intra-program 
inefficiency by making all the units of the same programme appear as strongly or Pareto-
Koopmans efficient. As a result, the potential improvement in DMU0 would be the result of 
an increase in its outputs and a specific decrease in each of its inputs. Formally, the values for 
inputs and outputs projected onto the efficient frontier are: 
0 00 ˆ , 1,..., , i ii xxs i m
− = −=  and        (2) 
000 0 ˆ , 1,..., , r rr y ys r s φ
+ = ⋅− =         (3) 
Where  φ0,  is  as already noted, the efficiency obtained for DMU0,  while 
-
i0 s   and 
+
r0 s   are, 
respectively, the optimal slacks in input i and output r of this unit obtained from program (1). 
The third step consists of solving the mathematical program (1) for all the DMUs in the 
sample regardless of the group they belong to, using the adjusted data obtained in the previous 
step; that is, the values of inputs and outputs that are derived from expressions (2) and (3). 
Therefore, inter-program efficiency is estimated, allowing us to assess the difference in 
efficiency between programmes, once intra-program inefficiencies have been eliminated. The 
fourth and final step requires the use of a test aimed at evaluating the statistical significance of 
the differences in efficiency among programmes. We use the non-parametric tests by Mann-
Whitney (MW test). More details can be found in Conover (1999). 
 
4. Data, model specification and results 
4.1. Data and model specification 
Kittelsen and Førsund (1992) and Pedraja and Salinas (1995) measure court efficiency 
focusing mainly on the number of judges and office staff as important input factors. In a 
similar attempt, Gorman and Ruggiero (2009) analyze efficiency of US judicial district 
prosecution offices by considering the number of prosecutors, in addition to other staff 
members. Other studies managed to collect data on a wider range of input variables to 
measure court efficiency. Lewin et al. (1982), considered the number of district attorneys and 
assistants, working days of courts (proxy for the number of judges), caseload and the size of 
white population as input factors to measure court efficiency. Moreover, Schneider (2005),   19 
managed to collect data on judicial qualification and age to test their impact on the efficiency 
of German labour courts. 
Accordingly, this study uses DEA with a sample 22 FICs differentiating between civil and 
criminal jurisdictions.  Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample for both 
jurisdictions. The productive process of the courts is described using three inputs: number of 
judges (judges), number of administrative staff members (admin) and number of computers 
per court (computers) as a proxy variable of the capital. And an output: the number of 
resolved cases (resol). The used data set is obtained from the unpublished annual judicial 
reports available at the Egyptian MOJ, however some data are collected by the authors via the 
MOJ for the purpose of this study (e.g. the number of computers, the number of 
administrative staff for each jurisdiction within each court). 
 















Model  (1) is once implemented to carry an efficiency analysis regarding the civil case 
resolution procedure in the first place. Secondly, a similar analysis regarding the efficiency of 
criminal case resolution procedure is performed. Therefore, the values of the intra-program 
efficiency are obtained. The FICs of the civil jurisdiction are compared with the best practices 
observed among the civil courts and the same process is made for the criminal courts. In table 
6 the descriptive statistics of the efficiency results for both jurisdictions are depicted. 
    inputs  output 
    Computers  admin  judges  resol 
Civil  
Courts 
Mean  91.227  1,211.227  58.000  30,504.409 
S.D.  45.472  615.098  38.065  18,269.490 
Minimum  24  325  12  4,869 
Maximum  166  2,593  162  66,032 
Criminal 
courts 
Mean  61.500  193.864  44.773  304,504.409 
S.D.  30.230  88.078  23.735  169,996.044 
Minimum  17  65  11  65,365 
Maximum  111  351  97  667,230   20 
 
Table 6. Estimates of Efficiency 
 
    civil  criminal 
Intra-program 
efficiency 
Mean  1.298541  1.33647 
S.D.  0.37568  0.56213 
Minimum  1  1 
Maximum  2.29994  3.61108 
Inter-program 
efficiency 
Mean  13.96861  1 
S.D.  6.23700  0 
Minimum  7.5414  1 
Maximum  35.92010  1 
 
The efficiency results of civil district courts are more assembled around their average; hence 
enjoy lower deviations from their mean  when compared to their corresponding criminal 
districts of each court. On average, courts could increase their number of solved civil cases by 
25.85% and criminal cases by 33.65%.  
Tables 7 and 8 present efficiency rankings and input slacks for the criminal and civil districts 
of each court respectively. To order the efficient FICs in both jurisdictions the sum of the 
weights  (λj) that correspond to the efficient FIC in all the reference sets –best observed 
practices– that they belong (benchmarks) has been used. Additionally, although the efficiency 
rankings notably vary among both jurisdictions (see tables 7 and 8), the most inefficient FIC 
is Kena+Red Sea in both cases. An efficient behaviour would lead it to solve 133% more 
cases than in the civil jurisdiction, and a 261% in the penal jurisdiction.   21 




Efficiency  Benchmark 
Input slacks 
computers  admin  judges 
Giza  1.00000  2.71744  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
North Cairo  1.00000  2.65495  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Sohag  1.00000  1.88939  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Fayum  1.00000  1.20702  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Asyut  1.00000  1.10125  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Damietta  1.00000  1.02562  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Aswan  1.00000  0.46558  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Damanhour  1.00000  0.39460  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Port-Said  1.00000  0.27471  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Suez  1.00000  0.26944  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Ismalia  1.08462  -  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Menia  1.15178  -  0.00000  571.20000  0.00000 
South Cairo  1.28682  -  0.00000  710.40046  0.00000 
Beni Suef  1.35111  -  0.00000  70.50000  0.00000 
Alexandria  1.40435  -  44.83103  0.00000  0.00000 
Tanta  1.42549  -  0.00000  96.68070  0.00000 
Zakazik  1.57592  -  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Shebin El Kom  1.57962  -  0.00000  2.40426  0.00000 
Mansurah  1.65547  -  0.00000  196.52397  0.00000 
Banha  1.77376  -  14.93722  0.00000  0.00000 
Kafr El Sheikh  1.97909  -  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Qena  2.29994  -  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000   22 
Table 8. Criminal Case Ranking and input slacks for 22 FICs in 2010 
 
Efficiency  Benchmark 
Input slacks 
computers  admin  judges 
Alexandria  1.00000  8.66186  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Fayum  1.00000  5.73897  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Damietta  1.00000  1.04103  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Suez  1.00000  0.39535  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Port-Said  1.00000  0.16279  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Aswan  1.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Ismalia  1.00973  -  0.00000  7.95349  0.00000 
Damanhour  1.03739  -  0.00000  36.02128  53.44681 
Sohag  1.05600  -  0.00000  117.46556  0.00000 
Mansurah  1.09063  -  0.00000  152.14894  15.12766 
Zakazik  1.20043  -  0.00000  217.36170  43.59574 
Beni Suef  1.22400  -  0.00000  56.76596  1.08511 
North Cairo  1.29484  -  0.00000  30.98072  0.00000 
South Cairo  1.30520  -  0.00000  4.80851  10.97872 
Giza  1.31832  -  0.00000  113.51064  10.72340 
Tanta  1.31987  -  0.00000  127.42553  18.93617 
Kafr El Sheikh  1.41199  -  0.00000  161.31915  10.70213 
Banha  1.46211  -  0.00000  56.10213  2.74468 
Menia  1.60216  -  0.00000  151.31915  43.70213 
Asyut  1.65099  -  0.00000  147.46809  16.82979 
Shebin El Kom  1.80758  -  0.00000  94.21277  6.46809 
Qena  3.61108  -  0.00000  126.42553  21.93617 
 
Is it possible to affirm that criminal FICs present in average a better performance than civil 
FICs? Or in other words, are the intra-program efficiency differences statistically significant? 
In order to estimate the statistical significance of these differences the non-parametrical 
Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test is implemented. The results are presented in table 9 and indicate 
that there are no significant differences in efficiency between both jurisdictions if every court 
is compared with the best practices in its own jurisdiction. In other words, there are no 
differences in the managerial efficiency.    23 
 
 
Table 9. Results for Mann-Whitney tests 
 




Average range  21.86  23.14 




Average range  33.5  11.5 
Z-statistic (p-value)  -6.072* (0.000) 
 
a The null hypothesis is that the two samples are drawn from the same population. 
* Significant at 99%. 
 
The absence of difference in managerial efficiency however does not necessarily imply the 
absence of differences in program efficiency among both types of court jurisdictions, as 
explained before.  Accordingly, it becomes interesting to analyse whether  one of the two 
programs –civil and criminal– present superiority in its inter-program efficiency.  
In order to respond to this question again our data results of our model explained in section 
3.3 is used. As explained before, table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of the results in the 
inter-program efficiency and table 9 depicts the results of the KW test for both programs. In 
this case, the inter-program efficiency differences are statistically significant. In fact, every 
criminal court is in the frontier of best practices, while civil courts appear as inefficient (see 
table 6). However, this difference in the inter-program efficiency is not related to managerial 
inefficiency  within each court.  Hence,  it becomes important to search for the causes of 
criminal program superiority against its corresponding civil one within each court, which is 
due to the paucity of data beyond the objective of this study. 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
It can be said that the Egyptian MOJ has cut the first round of its judicial reform program. 
However depending on court resolution rates to measure court efficiency might hinder the 
ministry to discover lots of valuable information regarding the efficient use of resources 
available in each court. In order to draw adequate policy recommendations, further empirical 
analysis is required to test the impact of each input variable on the case resolution rate before 
and after the reform program in order to identify the most important obstacles of judicial 
efficiency. When designing further reform policies, the performance of individual courts must 
be compared and ranked by the ministry using more reliable techniques (e.g. the Data   24 
Envelopment Analysis), to observe a clearer view of each courts performance, taking all input 
factors into consideration. 
Regarding the efficiency of the civil courts, our results show that North Cairo, Giza, 
Damanhour,  Damietta, Port-Said, Suez, Fayum, Asyut, Sohag and Aswan are efficient, 
although altogether show a volume of 111,234 pending cases.  
On the contrary, Banha, Zakazik, Mansurah, Shebin El Kom, Kafr El Sheikh and Qena are 
inefficient. In those FICs, the promotion of an efficient behaviour would permit to solve all 
the pending cases with the available inputs. Capital input computers could be even reduced in 
Banha, while it is advised to reduce admin in Mansurah and Shebin El Kom (see slacks in 
table 7). 
South Cairo, Alexandria, Tanta, Ismalia, Beni Suef and Menia are also inefficient, showing a 
total of 138,019 pending cases. However, in those FICs, a better performance would still 
maintain a total volume of 84,265 pending cases. In other words, the resolution of a greater 
volume of cases in those 6 civil courts requires greater amounts of inputs. In this regard, it 
would be necessary to hire a greater amount of judges in all 6 courts. Moreover computers 
should be increased in all the FICs except for Alexandria, and finally administrative staff 
should be increased only in Alexandria and Ismalia (see slacks in table 7). 
As for the criminal courts, Alexandria, Damietta, Port-Said, Suez, Fayum and Aswan are 
efficient, although together they show a volume of 110,839 pending cases.  
On the contrary, North Cairo, South Cairo, Giza, Banha, Tanta, Zakazik, Mansurah, Shebin El 
Kom, Kafr El Sheikh, Beni Suef, Menia, Asyut, Sohag and Qena are inefficient. For those 
FICs the promotion of an efficient behaviour would permit to solve all pending cases with the 
available inputs. It is even recommended to reduce admin input in North Cairo and Sohag, 
and admin and judges in within the remaining inefficient courts (see slacks in table 8).  
Damanhour and Ismalia are also inefficient, showing together 85,507 pending cases, but in 
those FICs better performance would still maintain a total volume of 63,342 pending cases. 
Therefore, the resolution of a greater volume of cases would require greater input volume. In 
particular, it would be necessary to increase the  level of judges  solely  in Ismalia and 
computers in both courts (see slacks in table 8). 
Nevertheless, there are not statistically significant differences in the managerial efficiency in 
both jurisdictions. However, the differences of inter-program efficiency between both 
jurisdictions are quite large. In fact, from a joint frontier between civil and criminal courts,   25 
members of the first group appear all to be relatively inefficient while the members of the 
latter one are all efficient. One of the possible reasons could be that the civil cases require 
generally greater qualifications and experience from a judge than the one obtained by a degree 
in law school. Moreover, most judges interviewed during the data collection phase of the 
study agreed upon, that civil cases are complex in nature rather than criminal cases, especially 
when involving a case where both conflicting parties hide evidence from court or try to use 
unethical lawyers to postpone the case resolution process. However, the most plausible reason 
might be that the Egyptian government gives more attention to the penal causes, since it 
shows the degree of juridical stability of the country. In other words, a great crime index 
represents lower stability degrees which in turn might destroy  the external image of the 
country.  
Finally, it must be mentioned that the absence of reliable data hinders a lot of progress in the 
field of analyzing court performance in Egypt. The process of data collection and data 
presentation within the MOJ still suffer from lots of draw backs, which can be considered a 
main drawback of the system, even after the reform program.   26 
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